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Abstract
National narratives serve to foster a sense of collective
continuity—the perception that the nation has preserved its
traits, values and goals across many generations. The pre-
sent study explores some of the correlates of such percep-
tions of collective continuity (PCC). We predicted that
people who see their nation as more continuous would tend
to think about social groups in more strongly essentialist
terms and to feel personally attached to other group mem-
bers (a phenomenon known as identity fusion). An interna-
tional sample of 307 respondents (predominantly from the
United States and India) completed measures of PCC, social
essentialism, identity fusion and national identification.
Both hypotheses were supported at the level of the level of
the full sample, suggesting that perceived national continu-
ity is related to a general cognitive predisposition for essen-
tialist thinking and also to one's sense of personal
attachment to the nation. However, exploratory analyses by
nationality revealed that the results could not be replicated
with the Indian participants, potentially as a result of cul-
tural factors. Identity fusion was also more strongly corre-
lated to cultural/essentialist continuity than to historical
continuity. Interpretations and directions for future
research are discussed.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Nationalism as a political project is based on the idea that national self-determination is the only legitimate ground
for political sovereignty. However, as many theorists of nationalism (e.g., Billig, 1995; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986)
have noted, this political claim is itself often predicated on certain ontological assumptions, specifically naive realist
beliefs about nations being somehow natural or objectively real. One could divide these ontological beliefs in two
broad categories: beliefs in the underlying objective reality of the nation and in its transgenerational continuity.
The first category includes ethnicist beliefs about nationhood as defined by some physical essence, such as
genes or blood, or arising out of a connection with the soil of the motherland. But beliefs in the underlying reality of
nations can be accommodated by civic nationalisms as well—for example, culture can serve as an ersatz national
essence (Froio, 2018), especially if a given nation's culture is seen as monolithic and unchanging. In the social psycho-
logical literature, this type of naive realist belief in the naturalness of nations is referred to as “essentialism.”
The second component of the ontological dimension of nationalism is a belief in the nation's temporal continu-
ity: “nations not only have to be imagined, but also have to create their own histories” (Billig, 1995, p. 70). People
who hold such beliefs will see themselves as part of a historically continuous community going back centuries; they
usually talk about multiple generations as part of a single national organism, using phrases like “We defeated Napo-
leon and Hitler,” or “Within a hundred years we may cease to exist as a nation.” The “us” one identifies with is com-
posed not just of living people that one can meet and form connections with but also represents a long
transgenerational chain of being. This creates a sense of shared destiny with one's countrymen, including the ones
who died centuries ago and others who are yet to be born; past glories and humiliations are experienced as directly
relevant and emotionally salient in the present, as if the individual's self is somehow “projected” into the past.
1.1 | Perceived collective continuity
In recent years, some social psychologists have turned their attention to the study of perceptions of continuity, at
both the individual and collective levels, and the role continuity plays in identity construction. It has been suggested
(e.g., by Vignoles, 2011; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015) that the formation of our personal and collective identities is
driven by a range of factors, such as the need for self-esteem, for belonging and acceptance, for meaning and pur-
pose, the need to feel competent and capable and, crucially, the need for continuity. For individuals, having a sense
of personal continuity (recognising oneself in one's past actions and being able to imagine one's life in the future) fos-
ters emotional resilience in the face of life changes and is an important safeguard against depression and suicide
(Chandler & Lalonde, 2008; Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003). Moreover, this need for personal continuity
can motivate individuals to identify with groups that are also perceived as enduring and temporally continuous, as
shown by Smeekes and Verkuyten (2013, 2014a). In the context of national identities, this kind of collective continu-
ity is most often expressed in the form of a national narrative that can perform a wide range of functions: It can serve
to justify existing institutional arrangements, to motivate collective action and guide political behaviour (Liu &
Hilton, 2005) and to determine who belongs in the group and who does not.
The rhetorical strategies through which people achieve a degree of continuity in their personal and collective
identities were explored by Chandler et al. (2003) and Chandler and Lalonde (2008) in the context of the identity nar-
ratives of Canadian First Nations adolescents. The researchers identified two broad sets of strategies, which they
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categorised as “essentialist” and “narrativist.” Essentialist rhetoric assumes that there is some identity-conferring
essence (e.g., genes and the soul) that guarantees that a person remains the same across different life episodes; it
sees change as superficial and inconsequential. In contrast, the narrativist approach acknowledges that in some ways,
the person has changed profoundly during his or her life, but paradoxically, self-continuity can be reaffirmed by trac-
ing the trajectory of these changes and by constructing a narrative that describes how the person became what he
or she is today.
The idea that people strive to achieve a sense of national continuity was further explored by Sani et al. (2007),
who adapted the essentialist–narrativist framework to explain how people achieve collective, rather than personal,
continuity. In their reading, perceived collective continuity (PCC) consists of two components: belief in the cultural
continuity of the group (i.e., its shared values and traits), which maps onto Chandler et al.'s essentialist strategy, and
belief in the historical continuity of the group (i.e., belief that the group's past forms an intelligible narrative, with
periods of ascendancy and decline following a historical trajectory over multiple generations), reflecting the nar-
rativist strategy.
PCC can have a direct effect on the dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion, as well as on the type of relation-
ship that individual group members form with the collective. For example, Jetten and Wohl (2012) showed that when
people's trust in the endurance and continuity of their nation is undermined, this leads them to adopt anti-
immigration views to protect the nation's distinctiveness. Likewise, in one survey, Dutch participants who professed
stronger beliefs in the essentialist continuity of Dutch people also reported seeing Muslim immigrants as a bigger
threat to their nation (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014b), and in another experimental study, people's attitudes towards
both friendly and hostile out-groups were magnified when they were led to believe that these groups were more
continuous (Warner, Kent, & Kiddoo, 2016). Still, as Smeekes and Verkuyten (2015) have pointed out, relatively few
studies have looked at the functional difference between cultural/essentialist and historical/narrativist continuity.
The main aim of the present study is to build on these findings by establishing a link between PCC and two other
relevant constructs in social psychology: social essentialism, a cognitive bias that could potentially underpin PCC, and
identity fusion, a particular form of alignment with the in-group characterised by a visceral sense of oneness and
kinship with other group members (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009). By investigating a link between
these three constructs we aim to explore whether perceptions of national continuity are related to a more general
proneness to think about human beings in essentialist terms and to a corresponding deep emotional attachment to
the nation.
1.2 | PCC and social essentialism
Several factors contributing to increased PCC have been proposed, including the endorsement of national narratives
(Smeekes, McKeown, & Psaltis, 2017), the need to manage the existential anxiety stemming from death awareness
(Sani, Herrera, & Bowe, 2009; Usborne & de la Sablonnière, 2014) and the need for a temporally stable social identity
(Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).
In addition to these putative correlates of PCC, we propose that beliefs in collective continuity are also
underpinned by social essentialism—a general proneness to seeing social groups as ontologically real “natural kinds”
(Gelman, 2003; Haslam, 2017; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Unlike mere stereotyping,
essentialism includes the intuition that a group's stereotypical traits are somehow rooted in a deep, unchanging
“essence”: a “national spirit,” “mana,” the effects of geography and climate on the national character (Perkins, 2016),
or DNA (Fleising, 2001; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995).
Essentialism has been consistently linked with increased distancing from out-groups, including prejudice
(Falomir-Pichastor, Mugny, & Berent, 2017; Hoyt, Morgenroth, & Burnette, 2019; Skewes, Fine, & Haslam, 2018;
Wilton et al., 2018) and is a particularly relevant factor in the study of national identity and prejudice against out-
groups (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). In discussing the psychological roots of out-group derogation, Pehrson,
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Brown and Zagefka (2009) have argued that a strong feeling of national identity does not necessarily lead to xeno-
phobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. What matters instead is how individuals construct or define their nation. Spe-
cifically, ethnic (as opposed to civic) nationalism was shown to moderate the relationship between the strength of
national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes: Among people with a strong national identity, those who saw their
nation in more essentialist terms were also more hostile to immigrants. Ethnic nationalism can be seen as one mani-
festation of essentialist thinking, whereby ethnic minorities and immigrants can be seen as foreign bodies in the
national “organism,” threatening the organic unity and cohesion of the group. Ethnic/essentialist nationalism leads to
two contradictory attitudes (Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013): Rejecting the possibility that an immigrant can
ever become an equal member of the nation-group, while simultaneously perceiving immigrants as a threat to
national cohesion and demanding more integration.
The conceptual links between social essentialism and PCC are easy to discern—essentialist thinking relies on a
set of cognitive abilities emerging in early childhood (Gelman, 2003), such as the ability to distinguish between an
object's appearance and its true identity or function; and to track an object's identity through time, even as its
appearance changes dramatically. These cognitive abilities can be directly mapped onto the components of collective
continuity: For example, the belief that there is a set of core national traits or values that define national identity
despite superficial differences between group members resembles the appearance/essence distinction in essential-
ism and the belief that the nation remains essentially the same entity, even as all its individual members are replaced
over many generations corresponds to identity tracking in essentialism.
Because of these conceptual similarities, it is possible that individuals who have essentialist intuitions about the
characteristics of social groups will be more likely to endorse narratives about the collective continuity of nations.
Hence, we propose that PCC and especially its essentialist component (cultural continuity) are related to a general-
ised readiness to perceive social groups in essentialist terms.
1.3 | Identity fusion theory
In addition to its link to essentialism, we were interested in exploring how PCC is related to identity fusion—a type
of alignment with social groups which describes the merging of an individual's personal and collective selves, creating
a visceral sense of oneness with the group (Swann et al., 2009; Swann et al., 2014; Swann & Buhrmester, 2015;
Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012).
The founders of Identity Fusion Theory cite as its precursors Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979)
and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Both theories emerged out
of Tajfel and his colleagues' minimal groups studies (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), which dem-
onstrated that categorisation, or the “sorting” of others into groups, can enable people to make sense of their social
world and to derive guidelines for action under conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, once people had come to
identify with their experimentally created social groups, they began to act in ways that privileged other members of
their in-group and disadvantaged the out-group (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1999). Both SIT and SCT elaborated on
the social identity perspective in direct opposition to earlier instinctual theories of conflict (Billig, 2002). Nearly four
decades after their inception, they are now among the most popular cognitive theories of inter-group interactions.
Identity Fusion Theory takes as its starting point the distinction between the personal and the collective self in
SIT, where the two forms of identity are separate and distinct: My personal identity contains the traits, memories
and preferences that characterise me as an individual, whereas my collective identity contains all the information
about myself that I derive from my membership in my social group. Where Identity Fusion Theory departs from SIT
is in the proposition that in some people, the two identities can become “fused,” in which one's personal identity and
social identity become intertwined, and group membership becomes an essential component of one's personal iden-
tity (Fredman et al., 2015; Swann et al., 2009; Swann & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann & Talaifar, 2018). This intercon-
nection between the self and the group leads highly fused individuals to perceive their social group as an extension
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of themselves and to experience any threat to the group as a threat to their own wellbeing. This ultimately leads
strongly fused people to report an increased willingness to sacrifice their own life to protect their group from harm
(Gómez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2009; Swann et al., 2014; Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010).
An example of identity fusion is the deep attachment an individual may develop to their close family to the
extent that a significant part of their self-concept is informed by their personal relationships with other
family members (Walsh & Neff, 2018). However, identity fusion can also occur with larger social groups, such as a
national or religious community (Fredman, Bastian, & Swann, 2017), where a feeling of oneness can be maintained
despite the individual being unable to establish personal relationships with every single group member.
Strongly fused people have been shown to endorse extreme behaviours in the name of the group (Gómez
et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2014). In a series of studies by Swann et al. (2009), participants completed a priming task
which subliminally activated their personal or social self-concepts, depending on the condition. When compared with
non-fused people, strongly fused participants were more willing to fight to defend their nation when either one of
their self-concepts were activated. Identity fusion also predicted the likelihood of choosing to sacrifice one's own life
in order to save several members of one's in-group in a trolley dilemma (Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, et al., 2010).
Purzycki and Lang (2019) also explored the effects of identity fusion in less extreme circumstances, demonstrating
that in economic games, strongly fused individuals sacrifice a larger amount of their income to benefit other group
members than weakly fused people do.
Although the consequences of identity fusion have been explored in detail, the factors that promote or inhibit it
have been the subject of more theoretical speculation than practical research. Until very recently, the main hypothe-
sis about the path to fusion was that it was a cultural product (rather than an evolved mechanism; cf. Thomsen &
Fiske, 2018) of collective dysphoric or life-changing experiences (Whitehouse, 2018; Whitehouse, McQuinn,
Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014), such as collective trauma or rituals involving pain or punishment. Still, Kavanagh, Jong,
McKay and Whitehouse (2019) have demonstrated that positive experiences and rituals can also foster identity
fusion and a degree of social cohesion. One possible way of reconciling these two positions is to suppose that it is
not specifically the valence of the collective experience that drives identity fusion but rather the degree to which this
experience is personalised (i.e., shared by other individual group members; Whitehouse, 2018).
1.4 | PCC and identity fusion
A key aspect in which identity fusion differs from identification is that fusion can lead to perceiving the group as
fictive kin (Swann et al., 2012). For example, a person who identifies strongly with France without being strongly
fused with it may attach great importance to, and take pride in, being French (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992;
Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Evans & Kelly, 2002; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). However,
identification entails an emotional attachment to the nation as an abstraction, or as a label (“being French”), and
not necessarily to other individuals of the same nationality. In contrast, identity fusion encompasses an additional
layer of emotional attachment and a sense of kinship with other group members as individuals. Strongly fused
individuals, in addition to identifying with their nation, are also more likely to believe that all members of their
nation share certain “essential” characteristics (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015) and should act together to accomplish
the group's goals.
There are clear parallels between identity fusion (as a type of relationship with the social group) and PCC (as a
mental representation of the group). Identity fusion implies the perception that a group can and does act in a con-
certed manner in pursuit of its shared goals. According to Lickel et al.'s (2000) typology of social groups, groups that
meet this criterion can be both small (such as a family, a military unit or a group of firefighters) and large (such as a
nation). Of these two, fusion with the smaller unit should be able to occur without the need for symbolic mediation,
since all group members are free to interact with each other and to form direct personal relationships. However,
when the object of identity fusion is a larger group, such as an entire nation, the size of the group represents a
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barrier to any direct relationships between an individual and all other group members; in such cases, fusion would
require the merging of one's self-concept with a particular representation of the group that emphasises its shared
goals across time (cultural continuity) and its shared historical trajectory or destiny (historical continuity)—that
is, fusion should require a high-continuity representation of the group. Furthermore, because fusion is often
accompanied by a belief that group members share certain essential characteristics, the cultural/essentialist continu-
ity component of PCC could be more important vis-à-vis fusion than the historical/narrativist continuity
component is.
To summarise, there is a clear conceptual link between identity fusion and PCC, although to date, no studies
have demonstrated this link empirically. Exploring this connection further could provide evidence for the way spe-
cific social relationships (fusion) map onto corresponding mental and rhetorical representations of that group (beliefs
in national continuity).
1.5 | Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical considerations outlined above, we predict that PCC will be positively correlated with partic-
ipants' endorsement of essentialist beliefs (Hypothesis 1) and with the degree to which they are fused with their
nation (Hypothesis 2). To test the link with essentialism, we will measure participants' essentialist beliefs about
human personality in general (i.e., whether the traits that define people are inborn, immutable and fixed). Finding a
link between the two can serve as evidence that PCC is related to a general cognitive tendency for social essential-
ism and not just to a tendency to essentialise one's own national group. We also predict a positive correlation
between PCC and identity fusion (Hypothesis 2). To ascertain whether this link is due specifically to identity fusion
and not to the element of patriotism present in both constructs, we will also control for the strength of participants'
national identification.
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Recruitment method
Respondents were recruited on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which is used extensively in
socio-psychological surveys and experimental research. Platforms like MТurk are designed to facilitate the large-
scale collection of survey data, and their participant pools tend to be more diverse and representative of the general
population than the university samples often used in psychological research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011),
which has contributed to the widespread adoption of such platforms in social psychologists over the past decade.
However, a downside of this sampling method is the increased potential of inattentive responses, which requires the
introduction of attention and comprehension checks, with the concomitant increase in attrition rates compared to
face-to-face data collection.
2.2 | Participants
Data were collected from 499 respondents in exchange for a small fee, of which 307 (55% male, Mage = 37.1,
SDage = 12.4) remained after exclusions (incomplete responses = 94, failed two attention checks = 69 and duplicate
IP addresses = 29). Participation was open to all MTurk workers regardless of nationality, as we aimed to test for
associations between fusion, PCC and essentialism both within and across cultures. A majority of the respondents in
the final sample were from the United States (N = 204, 46% male, Mage = 39.3, SDage = 13.2) and India (N = 88, 75%
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male, Mage = 31.7, SDage = 8.2). The study received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee at Royal
Holloway, University of London.
2.3 | Materials and procedure
Respondents were informed that they would be taking part in a survey on social cognition and national identities
and were asked to complete a series of four questionnaires in a randomised order.
PCC was measured using Sani et al.'s (2007) 12-item self-report instrument, which captures two dimensions: cul-
tural and historical continuity. Items include statements like “My nation's shared values, traditions, and beliefs have
endured across the generations” (cultural continuity) and “Major phases in my nation's history are linked to one
another” (historical continuity). Respondents indicated their agreement with a list of 12 statements on a 7-point
Likert scale with responses ranging from 1 (I totally disagree) to 7 (I totally agree), with higher scores indicated greater
degree of perceived continuity. The measure had a good level of internal consistency in Sani et al.'s analysis, with a
Cronbach's alpha of .80 (.77 and .82 for the History and Culture subscales, respectively), and Sani et al. (2009) pro-
vided additional evidence for its good discriminant validity.
Social essentialism was measured using 18 items taken from Bastian and Haslam's (2006) psychological essen-
tialism scale, which operationalises essentialism as a tripartite construct consisting of beliefs about social catego-
ries as discrete, informative and grounded in biology. Items included statements like “People can behave in ways
that seem ambiguous, but the central aspects of their character are clear-cut” (discreteness), “Generally speaking,
once you know someone in one or two contexts it is possible to predict how they will behave in most other con-
texts” (informativeness) and “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their genetic inheritance”
(biological basis). Bastian and Haslam found the measure to have good internal consistency (Cronbach's
alpha = .82). Responses were recorded on a 6-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree), following
the response format in Bastian and Haslam's original study. Upon completion, individual item scores were added
up (after recoding any reverse-coded items) and a mean social essentialism score was calculated, with higher
values indicating greater endorsement of essentialist beliefs. The same procedure was repeated for the other
three questionnaires.
Identity fusion was measured using Gómez et al.'s (2011) 7-item Identity Fusion Scale (sample items: “I am one
with my country” and “I'll do for my country more than anyone else would do”), which they report to have a high
degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .84).
National identification was measured using a tripartite measure of group identification (Henry, Arrow, &
Carini, 1999), consisting of subscales that capture affective (e.g., “I enjoy interacting with other members of my
nation”), behavioural (e.g., “Everyone needs to contribute to achieve the nation's goals”) and cognitive identification
(e.g., “I think of this nation as part of who I am.”). Henry et al. found that the scale had a total Cronbach's alpha of
.85–.89 across two samples of university students (coefficients for the individual subscales were .79–.84 for affec-
tive, .80–.83 for behavioural and .76–.78 for cognitive identification). Responses on both measures were recorded
on the same 7-point scale used in the PCC measure.
2.4 | Design and analysis
The study had a correlational design with four continuous variables: PCC, social essentialism, identity fusion and
national identification. A mean score was calculated for each instrument used in the materials, after recoding any
reverse-coded items. We checked that the data met the assumptions of homogeneity of variance and normality and
produced a matrix of Spearman's rho rank correlation coefficients between PCC, essentialism, fusion and identifica-
tion. To test Hypothesis 1, we planned to conduct a multiple regression on PCC with age, sex and social essentialism
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as predictors. For Hypothesis 2, a similar multiple regression was to be conducted predicting PCC scores from age,
sex, identity fusion and national identification.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Structure and reliability analyses
Descriptive statistics for all measures are reported inTable 1. A reliability analysis revealed that all measures had a good
degree of internal consistency. Out of the two subscales of PCC, historical continuity had a somewhat lower internal
consistency (Cronbach's α = .723) than cultural continuity (α = .893) due to three problematic items which were only
weakly correlated with the rest of the subscale: item 8 (“There is a causal link between different events in the history
of my nation.”) and the two reversed items, 6 and 12 (“There is no deeper connection between past, present, and
future events in my country” and “There is no continuity between different ages in our national history”, respectively).
We used a confirmatory factor analysis to test the two-factor structure of the PCC measure, using full informa-
tion maximum likelihood estimation for the missing data. The analysis was performed in R version 3.6.1 (R Core
Team, 2019) using lavaan 0.6-4 (Rosseel, 2012). The 12 PCC items were included in a two-factor model, and the
latent factors were standardised. The model had an acceptable but not perfect fit (TLI = 0.88, RMSEA = 0.098, 90%
CIs [0.085, 0.113]) and was a better fit than an alternative one-factor model, χ2(1) = 144.48, p = <.001. Factor load-
ings are reported inTable 2.
3.2 | Gender, nationality and age effects
Initial comparisons showed that on average, males had higher identity fusion scores, males: M (SD) = 4.81 (1.54);
females:M (SD) = 4.42 (1.43), U = 9,651.5, p = .010, and PCC scores, males: M (SD) = 5.11 (0.81); females: M (SD) = 4.81
(0.85), U = 9,366, p = .003, than women; after analysing the separate components of the PCC measure, the effect was
maintained only for cultural continuity, males: M (SD) = 5.12 (1.00), females: M (SD) = 4.66 (1.15), U = 8,963.5, p = .001,
but not for historical continuity. No gender effects on essentialism and identification were found.
A further analysis of the sample by country of origin showed that the effects of gender were significant only for
the Indian subsample and could not be replicated with the American. Responders located in India also had higher
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics, internal consistency and intercorrelations (Spearman's rho)
M SD α 1 1a 1b 2 3 4
1. Perceived collective continuity 4.98 0.84 .865 —
1a. Cultural continuity 4.91 1.09 .893 .89*** —
1b. Historical continuity 5.05 0.84 .723 .80*** .48*** —
2. Social essentialism 3.4 0.57 .824 .12* .15** .07 —
3. Identity fusion 4.63 1.50 .948 .51*** .62*** .22*** .17** —
4. National identification 4.99 0.87 .837 .56*** .47*** .49*** .12* .59*** —
5. Age 37.12 12.35 — .11 .00 .18** −.03 −.01 .23***
Note: The measure of social essentialism uses a 6-point response scale, while all other measures use a 7-point scale, as in
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average fusion scores (Mdiff = 1.3, U = 4,153.5, p < .001), total PCC scores (Mdiff = 0.6, U = 5,270.5, p < .001) and
scores on the cultural continuity component of PCC (Mdiff = 1.0, U = 3,768.5, p < .001) compared with those in the
United States.
Given the heterogeneity of the American and Indian samples, we conducted a post hoc hierarchical regression
to determine whether the difference in fusion scores between the two groups would remain after accounting for the
demographic differences. In Step 1, we regressed fusion scores on sex and age and then added nationality in Step
2. As shown in Table 3, sex and age had no effect on fusion after nationality was included as a predictor,
F(1, 288) = 49.73, p < .001, suggesting that the difference in fusion scores between the American and Indian partici-
pants was not attributable to sex or age and could be the product of other demographic (e.g., level of education) or
cultural differences.
3.3 | Correlations
As shown in Table 1, PCC was correlated with both essentialism (rs = .12, p = .030) and identity fusion (rs = .51,
p < .001), and there were also weaker but still significant correlations between social essentialism on the one hand
TABLE 3 Hierarchical regression on identity fusion showing a significant effect of nationality above and beyond
sex and age (US and Indian samples only, N = 292)
Step 1 Step 2
Intercept 4.46 (0.30)*** 3.75 (0.29)***
Sex 0.49 (0.17)** 0.19 (0.17)
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Nationality 1.32 (0.19)***
R2 .03 .17




TABLE 2 Factor loadings for the measure of perceived collective continuity
Latent factor Indicator B SE Z p β
Cultural Item 1 0.768 0.067 11.423 <.001 .611
Cultural Item 3 1.123 0.063 17.793 <.001 .843
Cultural Item 5 1.125 0.065 17.437 <.001 .831
Cultural Item 7 0.871 0.069 12.602 <.001 .660
Cultural Item 9 1.138 0.068 16.721 <.001 .809
Cultural Item 11 1.191 0.068 17.446 <.001 .832
Historical Item 2 0.841 0.060 13.978 <.001 .748
Historical Item 4 0.881 0.057 15.467 <.001 .809
Historical Item 6 0.459 0.104 4.427 <.001 .273
Historical Item 8 0.616 0.066 9.262 <.001 .536
Historical Item 10 0.856 0.073 11.657 <.001 .657
Historical Item 12 0.435 0.093 4.657 <.001 .285
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and fusion and identification on the other. Additional comparisons showed that age was correlated with national
identification (rs = .23, p < .001) and perceived historical (but not cultural) continuity (rs = .18, p = .002).
3.4 | Hypothesis 1
To test the prediction that people are more likely to perceive their nation as temporally continuous if they also hold
social essentialist beliefs, we conducted a multiple regression on PCC with sex, age and social essentialism as predic-
tors. The results for the full sample (N = 307) showed that essentialism is a significant predictor of PCC even after
controlling for sex and age, with the whole model accounting for 9% of the variance in PCC. We then repeated the
same analysis with the two largest national groups in our sample, United States (N = 204) and India (N = 88) to test
whether these results hold up at the national level. Results for the American subset of the sample were consistent
with the first analysis; however, among Indian participants, PCC was linked only to age and not to sex or social
essentialism. All three models are summarised inTable 4.
We then conducted exploratory multiple regressions with the cultural (Table 5) and historical (Table 6) components
of PCC as the outcomes and the same predictors as above (sex, age and essentialism) to test for any potential differ-
ences in how social essentialist beliefs are related to the two forms of national continuity. As with the full PCC scale,
social essentialism scores predicted cultural and historical PCC in the American sample but not in the Indian sample,
suggesting the existence of cultural differences in the nature of the relationship between essentialism and PCC.
3.5 | Hypothesis 2
To determine whether national identity fusion would predict PCC above and beyond national identification, we con-
ducted multiple regressions on total PCC scores with sex, age, identification and fusion as predictors. The results,
summarised in Table 7, revealed that identification predicts PCC above and beyond sex and age for both the Ameri-
can and Indian samples. Crucially, the coefficient for identity fusion was also significant but only for the American
sample (β = .186, p = .029), indicating that for American participants fusion predicts its own share of the variance in
TABLE 4 A multiple regression testing for an effect of essentialism on PCC
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 3.414 0.32 −.217 10.667 <.001 R2 = .09, F(4, 303) = 10.24, p < .001
Sex 0.328 0.092 .392 3.547 <.001
Age 0.008 0.004 .124 2.257 .025
Essentialism 0.315 0.08 .216 3.94 <.001
United States Intercept 3.137 0.356 −.131 8.803 <.001 R2 = .11, F(4, 200) = 8.23, p < .001
Sex 0.233 0.109 .285 2.13 .034
Age 0.011 0.004 .181 2.71 .007
Essentialism 0.331 0.09 .246 3.693 <.001
India Intercept 4.145 0.741 −.213 5.592 <.001 R2 = .10, F(4, 84) = 3.09, p = .032
Sex 0.216 0.181 .284 1.189 .238
Age 0.026 0.01 .278 2.661 .009
Essentialism 0.08 0.186 .045 0.428 .670
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
10 SIROMAHOV ET AL.
PCC scores that cannot be accounted for by mere national identification. Follow-up regressions on the two compo-
nents of the PCC scale showed that fusion predicts cultural continuity above and beyond identification only for the
American participants but not for the Indian participants (Table 8); conversely, no effect of fusion on historical conti-
nuity (beyond mere identification) was found for the American sample, but a small negative coefficient (β = −.272,
p = .012) was found for the Indian sample (Table 9).
4 | DISCUSSION
The primary aim of the study was to investigate two potential correlates of the PCC of national groups. Although the
planned analyses confirmed the study's hypotheses, post hoc analyses problematised the connections between the
TABLE 5 A follow-up multiple regression predicting cultural continuity from social essentialism
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 2.992 0.418 −.239 7.16 <.001 R2 = .10, F(4, 302) = 10.94,
p < .001Sex 0.475 0.121 .434 3.93 <.001
Age 0.004 0.005 .049 0.891 .374
Essentialism 0.441 0.105 .230 4.217 <.001
United
States
Intercept 2.444 0.472 −.133 5.175 <.001 R2 = .11, F(4, 200) = 7.92, p < .001
Sex 0.313 0.145 .290 2.162 .032
Age 0.011 0.006 .131 1.955 .052
Essentialism 0.472 0.119 .266 3.982 <.001
India Intercept 5.079 0.756 −.274 6.714 <.001 R2 = .09, F(4, 83) = 2.6, p = .057
Sex 0.282 0.185 .367 1.523 .132
Age 0.021 0.01 .222 2.107 .038
Essentialism −0.093 0.19 −.051 −0.488 .627
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
TABLE 6 A follow-up multiple regression predicting historical continuity from social essentialism
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 3.414 0.32 −.123 10.667 <.001 R2 = .09, F(4, 303) = 10.24, p < .001
Sex 0.328 0.092 .219 3.547 <.001
Age 0.008 0.004 .173 2.257 .025
Essentialism 0.315 0.08 .138 3.94 <.001
United States Intercept 3.137 0.356 −.097 8.803 <.001 R2 = .11, F(4, 200) = 8.23, p < .001
Sex 0.233 0.109 .204 2.13 .034
Age 0.011 0.004 .175 2.71 .007
Essentialism 0.331 0.09 .158 3.693 <.001
India Intercept 4.145 0.741 −.122 5.592 <.001 R2 = .10, F(4, 84) = 3.09, p = .032
Sex 0.216 0.181 .162 1.189 .238
Age 0.026 0.01 .276 2.661 .009
Essentialism 0.08 0.186 .117 0.428 .670
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
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constructs under investigation and indicated the confounding role of specific national cultures in how the constructs
are related to each other. PCC was correlated with both social essentialism and identity fusion, and the regression
analyses showed that these relationships remained after controlling for demographic variables like sex and age.
TABLE 7 A multiple regression analysis testing for an effect of fusion on PCC above and beyond that of
identification
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 2.237 0.242 −.178 9.252 <.001 R2 = .37, F(5, 302) = 44.2, p < .001
Sex 0.269 0.078 .322 3.434 .001
Age 0.003 0.003 .042 0.881 .379
Identification 0.373 0.059 .388 6.275 <.001
Fusion 0.136 0.034 .244 3.987 <.001
United
States
Intercept 2.424 0.319 −.110 7.588 <.001 R2 = .28, F(5, 199) = 19.01,
p < .001Sex 0.196 0.099 .240 1.971 .050
Age 0.005 0.004 .087 1.409 .161
Identification 0.327 0.083 .338 3.948 <.001
Fusion 0.106 0.048 .186 2.203 .029
India Intercept 2.068 0.366 −.265 5.651 <.001 R2 = .54, F(5, 83) = 24.8, p < .001
Sex 0.269 0.130 .354 2.069 .042
Age 0.010 0.007 .103 1.348 .181
Identification 0.595 0.082 .723 7.268 <.001
Fusion −0.033 0.061 −.052 −0.535 .594
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
TABLE 8 Post hoc multiple regression analysis testing for an effect of fusion on the cultural component of PCC
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 2.072 0.312 −.167 6.645 <.001 R2 = .39, F(5, 301) = 48.32, p < .001
Sex 0.334 0.101 .305 3.317 .001
Age 0.001 0.004 .012 0.258 .796
Identification 0.202 0.077 .160 2.61 .009
Fusion 0.347 0.044 .477 7.834 <.001
United States Intercept 2.077 0.42 −.100 4.943 <.001 R2 = .28, F(5, 199) = 19.75, p < .001
Sex 0.235 0.131 .217 1.793 .074
Age 0.005 0.005 .056 0.91 .364
Identification 0.204 0.109 .160 1.874 .062
Fusion 0.287 0.063 .381 4.544 <.001
India Intercept 2.278 0.384 −.313 5.934 <.001 R2 = .51, F(5, 8) = 21.45, p < .001
Sex 0.319 0.136 .415 2.337 .022
Age 0.006 0.007 .065 0.813 .419
Identification 0.436 0.089 .523 4.897 <.001
Fusion 0.127 0.067 .200 1.906 .060
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
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Moreover, identity fusion was found to be more strongly correlated with the cultural continuity component of PCC
than with historical continuity. However, subsequent analyses by national group showed that these results could not
be replicated with the Indian subset of our sample.
A question worth addressing at this stage is the choice of data collection method and the quality of the data col-
lected, especially given the relatively high number of observations excluded due to failed attention checks. As dis-
cussed above, the method of data collection used in the present study has been used extensively in social research
for nearly a decade, with results equivalent to those obtained through more classic forms of survey research. Atten-
tion checks were also necessary to eliminate low-quality responses, and the fact that strong correlations were found
between theoretically linked variables (fusion and identification) indicates that the collected responses were non-ran-
dom. The fact that the identity fusion questionnaire has been validated across cultures (e.g., China, India, the United
States and Spain) over the past decade gives us confidence that the questions were interpreted in the same way by
different participants.
Our findings have several important implications. First, we argued on theoretical grounds that PCC (or at least
its cultural component) should depend at least partially on a social essentialist bias or a cognitive readiness to per-
ceive social groups as “natural kinds” with an immutable nature; this is likely to be the case because without the intu-
ition that some groups act like collective entities moving through time, it should be impossible to perceive a specific
group as highly continuous. However, the small correlation coefficient suggests that most of the variance in PCC is
attributable to factors outside this general cognitive bias. This interpretation is in line with Gelman's (2003) model of
the development of psychological essentialism, which proposes that as children grow, they are forced to reconcile
their essentialist intuitions with existing cultural beliefs and common-sense ideas which dictate which categories can
be seen as more essentialised than others and what the nature of their “essence” is.
A second implication of our findings is that the cultural and historical components of PCC are functionally dis-
tinct in their relationships with attachment to the nation. As predicted, fusion was more strongly correlated with cul-
tural than historical continuity, perhaps due to fusion being accompanied by a belief that nationhood is defined by
certain essential characteristics (e.g., culture, values or traditions). In contrast, no difference was observed between
TABLE 9 Post hoc multiple regression analysis testing for an effect of fusion on the historical component of PCC
Predictor B SE (B) β t p Model statistics
Full sample Intercept 2.416 0.263 −.141 9.174 <.001 R2 = .26, F(5, 298) = 26.84,
p < .001Sex 0.213 0.085 .254 2.491 .013
Age 0.004 0.004 .059 1.13 .259
Identification 0.548 0.065 .568 8.484 <.001
Fusion −0.08 0.037 −.143 −2.157 .032
United
States
Intercept 2.804 0.336 −.099 8.336 <.001 R2 = .19, F(5, 195) = 11.11,
p < .001Sex 0.172 0.105 .213 1.638 .103
Age 0.005 0.004 .090 1.344 .180
Identification 0.449 0.087 .472 5.168 <.001
Fusion −0.076 0.05 −.137 −1.516 .131
India Intercept 1.853 0.475 −.176 3.905 <.001 R2 = .47, F(5, 83) = 18.06, p < .001
Sex 0.214 0.168 .235 1.269 .208
Age 0.013 0.009 .115 1.388 .169
Identification 0.77 0.106 .781 7.25 <.001
Fusion −0.205 0.08 −.272 −2.572 .012
Note. The variable of interest in each analysis (essentialism, fusion, and identification) to make comparisons between the
three samples easier at a glance is presented in bold.
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the correlations of cultural and historical PCC with mere national identification. Future studies can explore the dis-
tinction between cultural/essentialist and historical/narrativist continuity, as well as the more general question about
any causal effects between fusion, PCC and social essentialism.
The findings also suggest a high degree of interplay between cognitive and cultural factors in the link between
PCC and identity fusion. The present study revealed a large difference in average identity fusion scores between US
and Indian participants, with the latter scoring on average much higher of the fusion scale. These results are broadly
consistent with previous findings concerning cultural differences in population norms for identity fusion (e.g., Swann
et al., 2014; see also Swann et al., 2009; Fredman et al., 2017, for similar studies with Spanish and Israeli samples,
respectively), but their interpretation is complicated by the heterogeneity of the American and Indian subsets of our
sample. Age and sex are two important confounds for measures of identity fusion, as seen in the present study, and
the Indian participants tended to be younger than the rest of the sample and predominantly male. Moreover, they
had higher fusion and PCC scores than the rest of the sample, and because their fusion scores were clustered
towards the higher end of the scale, it is possible that the variability in the data was not sufficient to detect the same
relationships as found with the full sample.
In addition to any demographic explanations for the differences in mean fusion scores between the US and
Indian subsamples, the potential effect of the dominant discourses about nationhood in both societies should also be
considered. For example, the prevalence of discourses about national “brotherhood” and metaphors of the nation as
an “imagined family” (Lauenstein, Murer, Boos, & Reicher, 2015) differs between cultures; hence, the language of
identity fusion could be perceived as more or less natural depending on the prevalence of this type of discourse in a
given society. In effect, people in some cultures may be more inclined to speak of “dying” for their “brothers”
because such language represents the normal way of expressing patriotism in their culture and not necessarily
because it reflects a deeper psychological commitment to the nation.
The difference in mean identity fusion scores between different cultural groups could therefore be attributed to
(a) a purely psychological phenomenon, whereby Indian participants become more strongly “fused” with their nation
than Americans do, and their identity fusion scores reflect that; (b) a difference in cultural discourses about nation-
hood in both cultures, where the same level of emotional attachment to the nation is expressed in different terms
depending on the dominant discourse in each culture; or (3) both, with the possibility that discourse affects an indi-
vidual's degree of fusion with the group. Future studies can address this question by exploring the effect of inter-
cultural differences in fusion scores on other factors known to be associated with fusion, for example, endorsement
of extreme sacrifice (Swann et al., 2014).
Likewise, cultural differences could account for the differences in mean PCC scores. To take the case of the
United States first, the American nation was built around a core of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants and expanded
through consecutive waves of immigration from the rest of the non-English world (Kaufmann, 1999). This fact alone
precludes the possibility of building national identity through shared ancestry and makes cultural assimilation the pri-
mary method for fostering social cohesion. In theory, therefore, American identity privileges language above ancestry
and ethnicity; however, in practice, conceptions of Americanness are more complex and contested. Citrin, Wong and
Duff (2001) have identified two rival conceptions of American identity, the liberal (commitment to democracy and
individualism; no need to extirpate immigrants' native cultures) and the nativist (Americanness means Anglo-Saxon
ethnicity; diversity erodes cohesion; therefore, immigration should be limited). Although their survey showed little
racial differences in patriotism among Americans, it found that Black respondents endorsed a more nativist version
of Americanness and valued Christianity as a marker of national identity more than Whites. Interestingly,
Schildkraut's (2007) respondents often held contradictory views (favouring both assimilation and diversity),
suggesting that a plurality of identity norms exist that is difficult to reduce to a single “American identity.”
India is even more divided than the United States along linguistic, religious and regional but also caste lines. Dur-
ing its liberation, only 40% spoke Hindi, which made language an ineffective basis for cultural unification (Adeney &
Lall, 2005). Furthermore, India's cultural diversity was not the result of recent immigration but of cultural co-evolu-
tion: Minority cultures are not newcomers, and there is no single hegemonic identity into which they can be
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assimilated. Therefore, one dominant conception of Indian identity upon independence was Nehruvian secular
nationalism, which defined Indianness territorially (India is a family of cultures within the same nation-state), valued
individual liberty and equality, and was more tolerant of cultural diversity (Parekh, 2006). The main alternative to this
liberal conception is offered by the Hindutva movement, which seeks to create a cohesive, self-conscious Hindu
nation that excludes Muslims from Indianness (Adeney & Lall, 2005).
The liberal and ethnicist identity norms in both cultures are further problematised by the way they are put into
practice by different political actors. National identities emerge out of a complex interaction between top-down pro-
jects (where political agents codify identities into constitutions and citizenship and immigration laws) and popular
support. In the American case, although Americans are generally confident about their ability to assimilate immi-
grants and derive strength from diversity, historically ethnicism has been more popular than is currently admitted:
Americanness has historically excluded African and Asian people, and in 1924, immigration was limited to Northern
Europeans (Citrin, Wong & Duff, 2011). Successive Indian governments have also deviated from their official ideol-
ogy when dealing with members of the diaspora, for example, emphasising shared ancestry when trying to reconnect
with affluent professionals living in the West, but downplaying it when dealing with the less affluent “old diaspora”
in South Asia (Adeney & Lall, 2005).
It is clear, therefore, that our participants in both subsamples had a plurality of identity norms to work with,
hence the difficulty of outlining a singular American or Indian identity. One pertinent difference is how the nature of
cultural diversity in the two countries affects the importance of cultural continuity. The source of diversity in the
United States is immigration, which requires the assimilation of newcomers into a “core” WASP culture; continuity
exists only insofar as the newcomers agree to identify with the local culture and begin to view its past as their own.
Meanwhile, this kind of assimilation is impossible in India, which leaves ancestry and continuity (e.g., inhabiting the
same territory) as the essential condition for belonging. These differences could explain the higher rates of belief in
cultural continuity in the Indian sample.
It should be noted here that any claims about the precise causal connections between PCC, essentialism and
identity fusion are at this stage only tentative and theory-driven. For example, we expect social essentialism to be a
necessary condition for PCC, rather than a mere correlate, because social essentialism describes beliefs about human
traits in general, while PCC is a perception of a specific social group. The logical next step would be to test for a
causal relationship between essentialist thinking (either domain-general or specifically focused on national identity)
and perceived national continuity. However, it is possible that both essentialism and PCC are affected by a third
underlying factor. To give but one example, the inherence heuristic proposed by Salomon and Cimpian (2014)
describes some people's tendency to explain social phenomena (such as “We drink orange juice for breakfast”) by
reference to inherent properties (“Orange juice is refreshing and helps us to wake up”) over alternative, historical and
context-dependent factors (e.g., “Orange juice became a staple item for many American families after a publicity
campaign by the fruit industry in the mid-20th century”). It is possible therefore that reliance on the inherence heu-
ristic, for example, among people with a more intuitive cognitive style (Kozhevnikov, 2007), might be an underlying
precondition for both essentialist thinking and PCC.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
Scholars of nationalism have noted that feelings of national identity and pride are often predicated on certain beliefs
about the underlying reality of nations: that they form organic groups or natural kinds and that their existence
stretches back in time across multiple generations. We have termed these beliefs the ontological component of
nationalism (in contrast to its political component) and argued that recent social psychological research has made
advances that allow us to study how such beliefs are underpinned by certain cognitive tendencies (e.g., the tendency
to essentialise social groups) and how they influence people's alignment with their nation (as in the case of identity
fusion). The present study has taken the first steps towards linking all of these concepts together, and we have
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attempted to outline some theoretical similarities and areas of overlap between them. We have also sought to dem-
onstrate that perceived national continuity is related to general social essentialism and that the cultural and historical
components of PCC are functionally distinct vis-à-vis identity fusion. However, the fact that these results vary across
different nationalities demonstrates the need to seek a balance between theorising about general cognitive pro-
cesses of identity formation on the one hand and culture-specific factors (national narratives or the famous ethnic-
civic distinction being only two among them) on the other. Additionally, any straightforward interpretation of these
results must be problematised by the difficulty of choosing an appropriate level of analysis: specifically, whether
these relationships should be understood in cognitive or in discursive terms, or as some interactions between the
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